Q&A #7: Question One

The first question I had regarding the status of nonhuman animals was whether the argument could be put forward that it is wrong to intentionally harm animals, as it compromises the potential for their living a full and meaningful life. This line of argumentation was similar to that which came up during the discussion of abortion and the rights of the potential human being (i.e the unborn fetus). I think that this claim could work, only if the value assigned to a human life and its prosperity were considered comparable or equal to that of an animal.  Our standing hierarchy in society is that human life surpasses all others in inherent value, which in principle I support but again preferring human life as more valuable reduces the value of animal lives. It would seem that in order to use potentiality as an argument for treating nonhuman animals with moral consideration, would require the claim that all life (not only human life) is inherently valuable and worthy of respect