Monday, November 12, 2012

Chimps and Mortality

The link below is an article by Scientific America discussing primates potential understanding of the concept of death

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=chimpanzees-understand-death

Q&A #7: Question Two

My second question this week on the status of nonhuman animals is whether there is an immoral facet to the concept of owning pets. I have come up with three potential mutual benefits to why owner and pet relationships can be a moral good. One is the simple fact that typically both owner and pet are pleased by the companionship of the other, usually there is emotion invested from the owner to animal which is compassionate and loving. Second in the case of adopting animals, many of which may have been previously abused or face uncertainty given the lack of resources and funding for animal shelters, adopting that pet into your life may significantly increase its health and its happiness. Third is that it would seem that people who grow up with pets, would be more sympathetic to the rights of animals having established an intimate connection with animals in their lives already. This is not to say that all animal owners and adopters behave in the manner I described earlier but I would hope that these people are a small immoral minority.

Note:
It would seem also that in order to be an owner who respects the life of the animal that it would be wrong to restrict them to a life of domestication indoors, however many people have outdoor cats and pets such as lizards or snakes which are not confined to cages or tanks.

Q&A #7: Question One

The first question I had regarding the status of nonhuman animals was whether the argument could be put forward that it is wrong to intentionally harm animals, as it compromises the potential for their living a full and meaningful life. This line of argumentation was similar to that which came up during the discussion of abortion and the rights of the potential human being (i.e the unborn fetus). I think that this claim could work, only if the value assigned to a human life and its prosperity were considered comparable or equal to that of an animal.  Our standing hierarchy in society is that human life surpasses all others in inherent value, which in principle I support but again preferring human life as more valuable reduces the value of animal lives. It would seem that in order to use potentiality as an argument for treating nonhuman animals with moral consideration, would require the claim that all life (not only human life) is inherently valuable and worthy of respect